

New PCI DSS Version 3.0: Can it Reduce Breaches?

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Core Competencies – C11





SISA Information Security

Formal Risk Assessment Specialists

- Authors of PCI Risk Assessment Guidance Document
- PCI Qualified Security Assessor (PCI QSA)
- Payment Application Qualified Security Assessor (PAQSA)
- Point to Point Encryption Encryption (P2PE QSA)
- Payment Forensics Investigator (PFI)
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CISA, CISSP, PCI QSA, PA-QSA

- Lead and Proposer for the PCI Risk Assessment Guidance Document
- Amongst the first PCI Qualified Security Assessors of the PCI Council
- OCTAVE Authorized Trainer from Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University





Session Objective

- Payment Card Industry Ecosystem
- Frauds/Breaches
- Understand the PCI DSS Version 3.0
- Solution to Breaches PCI DSS Formal Risk Assessment

Mode: Interactive (so please ask feel free to ask questions as I speak)



PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) ECOSYSTEM





Some Facts

NUMBER OF CARD TRANSACTIONS – **10,000** TRANSACTIONS PER SECOND

NUMBER OF NON CASH PAYMENTS IN 2013 – **333 BILLION CARD PAYMENTS – 181 BILLION**

IF EACH OF THE 7 BILLION ON THE PLANET HAD A CARD THEY WOULD HAVE USED IT ATLEAST **19 TIMES**



The Protagonist





Primary Account
Number PAN





EMV CHIP



HOLOGRAM



CARDHOLDER NAME



EXPIRY DATE



PAYMENT BRAND LOGO









TRACK and CHIP





Track 2 Data

Only Track 2 is used for financial

transactions







- Added Security Measures
- Whole lot of banking features





The Who is Who

PAYMENT BRANDS











BANKS









MERCHANTS









SERVICE PROVIDERS










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
Transactions – Card Present








Transactions - Card Not Present







TOP INHIBITIONS FOR USING CARDS





Payment Card Fraud Evolution



1983 F	Re-embossed	counter	feit :	fraud
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1988 Re-encoded counterfeit fraud

1989 Card not present fraud/fraud applications

1991 Never received issued fraud

1992 Merchant fraud


1994 Identity Theft

2000 Skimmed counterfeit

2002 Communications interception

2007 Wireless/ Chip sniffing and card counterfeit/ Fake terminals

2010-14 Server Hacking/Malware/Memory Scrapping










Today's Risks



Data Breaches — 139 Comments

Jewel-Osco stores hit again by data hack



CRCDEWA










What is at Stake

It's been estimated that 70% of attacks are on small businesses¹, and that more than 40% of customers who have been victims of fraud stop doing business with the merchant where the fraud occurred². 60% of small businesses breached close within six months³.

- 1. 2012 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report
- 2. Javelin Strategy and Research, June 2009
- 3. Symantec 2013 Internet Security Report









PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECUIRTY STANDARD (PCI –DSS) VERSION 3.0





Do I need PCI DSS?

PCI-DSS Compliance applies to any entity that

- Stores Card Holder Data
- Processes Card Holder Data
- Transmits Card Holder Data

Account Data consists of cardholder data and sensitive authentication data


- Entities include, but not limited to:
 - Merchants
 - Acquirers
 - Issuers
 - Service Providers
 - Trusted Third Parties






3 YEAR LIFE CYCLE







Feedback on v2.0








The most important slide

		Data Element	Storage Permitted	Render Stored Data Unreadable per Requirement 3.4
Account Data		Primary Account Number (PAN)	Yes	Yes
	Cardholder	Cardholder Name	Yes	No
	Data	Service Code	Yes	No
		Expiration Date	Yes	No
	Sensitive	Full Track Data ³	No	Cannot store per Requirement 3.2
	Authentication	CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID4	No	Cannot store per Requirement 3.2
	Data ²	PIN/PIN Block ⁵	No	Cannot store per Requirement 3.2

PCI DSS Requirements 3.3 and 3.4 apply only to PAN. If PAN is stored with other elements of cardholder data, only the PAN must be rendered unreadable according to PCI DSS Requirement 3.4.

Sensitive authentication data must not be stored after authorization, even if encrypted. This applies even where there is no PAN in the environment. Organizations should contact their acquirer or the individual payment brands directly to understand whether SAD is permitted to be stored prior to authorization, for how long, and any related usage and protection requirements.





Clarification on requirements

Table 3: PCI DSS Feedback Trends							
Topic	Feedback Suggestions						
PCI DSS Requirement 11.2	Prescribe use of specific tools, require ASVs to perform internal scans, and define what constitutes a "significant change".						
PCI DSS Scope of Assessment Provide detailed guidance on scoping and segmentation.							
PCI DSS Requirement 12.8	Clarify the terms "service provider" and "shared," and provide more prescriptive requirements regarding written agreements that apply to service providers.						
PCI DSS SAQs	Consider updating the SAQs; they are either too complex (difficult to understand) or not detailed enough. Either include more requirements, or do not include so many requirements.						
PCI DSS Requirement 3.4	Encryption and key management (e.g., keys tied to user accounts) are complex requirements; provide further clarification. Truncation/hashing/tokenization is not a convenient method to store and retrieve data;						
PCI DSS	Consider updating password requirements (expand authentication beyond just passwords).						
Requirement 8.5	The current password requirements are either too strict or not strict enough; be either less prescriptive or more prescriptive.						

/%



12 requirements - What's New!



- Clarity and explanation of requirements
- More elaborate testing procedures for Assessors
- Updated section to focus on assessment process rather than documentation.
- Focus is on Security and not Just Compliance through formal risk assessment

Scoping Segmentation and Sampling



- Scope Any system component or device located within or connected to the Cardholder Data Environment.
- Segmentation Segmentation is not filtering based on router/switch rules. It is actual isolation
- Sampling Emphasis on 'Representative Sampling'








SOLUTION for BREACHES – PCI FORMAL RISK ASSESSSMENT (12.2 OF PCI VERSION 3.0)





PCI-DSS Certification



Scoping PCI Risk Assessment Gap Analysis

Mitigation
Milestone Reviews

Audit
Report on Compliance
Certificate of Compliance





Formal Risk Assessment

- Risk Assessment is a process of identifying all threats and vulnerabilities that affect the <u>Cardholder Data Environment (CDE)</u>
- Risk Assessment is mandatory as per Requirement 12.2
- Approved methodologies include <u>ISO 27005, OCTAVE, NIST SP</u> 800-30
- You need to identify all possible risk scenarios that affect the CDE.
- Take is Business As Usual activity and not a one time measure



Plan a Formal PCI Risk Assessment



- Asset is Cardholder data and systems components in CDE (cardholder data environment)
- Account Data identification
 - Cardholder data scanner
 - Dataflow Diagram
 - Identify all payment channels
 - Account Data Matrix
- Scoping and Network Segmentation
- Identify all the Risk Scenario which can impact confidentiality of the cardholder data and CDE
- Address the RISKs: 4T's (Treat, Tolerate, Transfer and Terminate)
- Document/Report





Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results **Documentation**

Scope

- Physical Location building, room, etc.
- **Data Center**
- **Business Process**
- **Business Division**





Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results Documentation

Asset

- Cardholder Data
- Sensitive Authentication Data
- Business Processes
- Interactive Voice Response
- Web Payments (Merchants)
- Customer Services Call Centers
- Asset is measured in terms of Asset Value





Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results Documentation

Threat

- Threat is an actor which can potentially harm the asset. The threat can be accidental or deliberate.
- Threat is measured in terms of Likelihood of Threat (LHOT)





Vulnerability

Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results Documentation

- How a weakness in technology or organizational process can be exploited by a threat.
- Vulnerability is measured as Level of Vulnerability (LOV)







Risk profiling

Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results **Documentation** Measure of Risk = f(Asset Value, LHOT, LOV) Calculated after taking Risk Evaluation and Risk Acceptance Criteria into account **Existing Controls**

Revised Measure of Risk = Risk Score after **Applying New Controls**

Measured in terms of Measure of Risk (MOR) and Revised Measure of Risk (RMOR)



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Sample Risk Evaluation Criteria

	Likelihood of occurrence – Threat		Low		ľ	Mediun	n	High			
	Ease of Exploitation	L	M	Н	L	M	Н	L	M	Н	
	0	0	1	2	1	2	3	2	3	4	
Accet	1	1	2	3	2	3	4	3	4	5	
Asset Value	2	2	3	4	3	4	5	4	5	6	
	3	3	4	5	4	5	6	5	6	7	
	4	4	5	6	5	6	7	6	7	8	





Risk Treatment Plan

Scope

Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results **Documentation**

- Treat/Tolerate/Terminate/ Transfer
- Take Action if Treat/Transfer
- Take Approval if Tolerate/
 Terminate

Note: PCI requirements are minimum set of requirements. Any risk treatment cannot go below what is prescribed by PCI DSS.



Risk Assessment Report



Scope

Asset

Threat

Vulnerabilities

Risk Profiling

Risk Treatment Plan

Results **Documentation**

- Document A-T-V Combination with the associated Risk
- Calculation of Risk
- **RTP**
- **Action Taken**



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Case Study



- Company Background Wise Bank
- PCI Related Environment Payment
 Channels include:
 - i. Online store
 - ii. Retail outlets
 - iii. Self service kiosks
 - iv. Payments over mobile
 - v. Drop Boxes
 - vi. Call Center



Example for 'A-T-V'



Asset Name	Threats	Vulnerabilities	Risk
Online Payment Process	Insider Sniffing the traffic	App Server to Database Server in clear.	High
Supporting Assets: Apache Web Server EOS App Server Oracle 10G DB	Threat Properties Insider – Deliberate LHOT: High	LOV: Medium	High

RTP	Action
Treat	Encrypt traffic from App Server to Database Server



Results Documentation



Loc	atio	on N	ame			Address	;								
Kua	ala L	Lum	pur-WorldWide Tech - SE Asia												
Asset Description								1	Гуре		C	I	A	Asset Valu	
=	Cardholder Information Cardholder information and crit						r ider	ntity 1	Information ((Primary)	4	4	4	4	
	Application logs capture PAN			Access	Actor		Motive	U	HOT MOR		Action Ite	Action Item		ЮТ	RMOR
				Network	Human Outside	Deliberate		2 2		Add Actio	<u>Action</u>		0	1	
			Vulnerability		Ex	cisting Co	ontrols		LOV	Contro	ls A	ction I	tem	RLO	v
	Logging can be enabled by the Administrator as disabling logs is not driven by the application.								1	1 <u>Select Controls</u>			<u>ion</u>		0
	±	Ind	complete Encryption	Network	Human Outside		Deliberate	Location Name : Kuala Lump		-WorldWide Tech - SE Asia					
±	Lap	ptop	192.240.3.10	Laptop holds	critical cus	stomer d	ata.		MOR (Measure	of Risk)	Location wise Risk Sta			LOV (Level)	f Vulnerability)
±	Primary Health Information Primary Health Information health history of a patie related to their identity.					ent, while			53.00 %	HIGH	15 12 9	Love Mediu	n 15		Low Medium High
Sensitive Authentication Dat Sensitive Authentication CVV2 information.						n data ind	cludes Track	k 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5							
•	Customer Information Customers' credit card d								RMOR (Revised Hea	nsure of Risk)	Note : During the risk assessmenthe foregoing, 0 Risk Treatment				
									40.00 %	MICH					





"Think Big"





Get a feel of Risk Assessment?

Search "SISA Assistant" and sign up for FREE

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